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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent revival of Hyman P. Minsky’s ideas among policymakers, economists, 
bankers, financial institutions, and the mass media, synchronized with the increasing 
gravity of the subprime financial crisis, demands a reappraisal of the meaning and scope 
of the “financial instability hypothesis” (FIH). We argue that we need a broader approach 
than that conventionally pursued, in order to understand not only financial crises but also 
the periods of financial calm between them and the transition from stability to instability. 
In this paper we aim to contribute to this challenging task by restating the strictly 
financial part of the FIH on the basis of a generalization of Minsky’s taxonomy of 
economic units. In light of this restatement, we discuss a few methodological issues that 
have to be clarified in order to develop the FIH in the most promising direction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (FIH) has been discussed and 
extended by many scholars since its inception, it is not yet a full-fledged theory, as a 
precise specification of the relationship between some of the crucial variables is still 
missing or remains largely implicit (a critical survey of much of the literature may be 
found in Tymoigne [2006a, 2006b, and 2006c]). For that reason Minsky has been often 
accused of “implicit theorizing”; see, in particular, Tobin (1989). In this view, the 
theoretical axioms are not clearly spelled out and their implications for explanation and 
prediction are insufficiently argued (Toporowski 2005 and 2008). For that reason most 
academic economists dismissed the FIH, although a few high-level practitioners 
continued to consider it quite relevant for their choices. In our opinion, this is a non 
sequitur. We have to take seriously the criticism of implicit theorizing, but we should 
draw from it conclusions quite different from those of many of Minsky’s critics. Implicit 
theorizing is typical of new revolutionary theories (in the sense of Kuhn [1970]). After 
the first intuition of a new paradigm, the underlying theory is made fully rigorous and 
explicit only through the systematic work of generations of scholars. The invisible hand 
argument put forward by Adam Smith is a case of implicit theorizing. Walras and Pareto 
made a crucial step towards explicit theorizing about the working of a competitive market 
model a century later, but only with Arrow and Debreu the theory has been fully 
axiomatized after almost two centuries of efforts on the part of generations of 
economists.
1 Therefore, since we believe that in Minsky’s contributions there are 
important insights that we should not ignore, we have to invest in their development and 
clarification in order to make them more explicit and operational.  
What Schumpeter calls “preanalytic vision” (Schumpeter 1954) plays a crucial 
role in science, even in hard scientific disciplines such as physics (Kuhn 1970). This role 
is particularly important in a discipline such as economics that has to deal with the 
complexity of human motivations. What is really important in Minsky’s original version 
of the FIH is the powerful preanalytic vision of the working of a sophisticated financial 
economy, rather than the fragments of economic analysis in which he tried to translate it; 
see, in particular, Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986). We believe that Minsky’s vision proved to 
                                                 
1 The Arrow-Debreu model, however, lost much of the institutional, sociological, and psychological 
insights that we find in Smith. More in general we should be aware that the process of making a theory 
explicit is almost never without costs, as it often relies on reductionist strategies.   3
be increasingly relevant for an economy in which finance has been playing a growing 
role. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section we discuss why 
Minsky’s “vision” is so badly needed today. In the third section we develop a 
constructive criticism of Minsky classification of financial units that underlies his 
approach; this leads us to suggest a more general and operational classification. In light 
of this revised classification, in the fourth section we express, in qualitative terms, an 
elementary model that aims to express the core of FIH, i.e., its strictly financial part. In 
the light of this model, we are in a position to discuss in the fifth section some of the most 
controversial methodological issues underlying the FIH with the conviction that the 
future of the FIH depends on their constructive solution. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. MINSKY MOMENTS, RUSSELL CHICKENS, AND GRAY SWANS 
 
The sudden popularity enjoyed by Minsky’s FIH during the subprime financial crisis (and 
in other similar episodes before) reveals a widespread dissatisfaction with received 
economic wisdom, at least as far as financial crises are concerned. The prevailing point of 
view is that while orthodox theory is good enough in normal conditions (believed to 
apply most of the time) it is unsatisfactory in abnormal times characterized by severe 
financial instability (Minsky moments). Conventional theory is believed to be impotent to 
forecast, avoid, or mitigate a generalized and particularly deep financial crisis such as the 
subprime one. We contend that in order to understand financial crises and learn how to 
avoid or mitigate them, we need an approach much more general than that of mainstream 
economics. The inadequacy of orthodox theory in times of financial crisis does not 
depend on details that can be easily added or mended, but on its vision of the working of 
a monetary economy and, in particular, on a fundamental assumption that underlies its 
approach. This is the postulate of regularity of economic phenomena that is considered 
by many orthodox economists as a necessary requisite for economics as a “science.”
2 The 
most lucid and uncompromising statement of this position may be found in Lucas (1981). 
In his opinion, economics as a science has to be based on the equilibrium method that 
applies only to stationary stochastic processes: 
                                                 
2 This assumption is very similar to the postulate of “uniformity of nature” claimed, among others, by 
Galileo, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill to lie at the very foundations of natural 
science. Mill maintained that such a principle is a necessary foundation of inductive arguments. 
Inductivism has been subsequently rejected by philosophers of science such as Bertrand Russell and Karl 
Popper, even in reference to natural sciences.   4
 “insofar as business cycles can be viewed as repeated instances 
of essentially similar events, it will be reasonable to treat agents 
as reacting to cyclical fluctuations as ‘risk’ or to assume their 
expectations are rational, that they have fairly stable 
arrangements for collecting and processing information, and that 
they utilize this information in forecasting the future in a stable 
way, free of systematic and easily correctable biases.” (Lucas 
1981: 224) 
 
Lucas does not deny that economic phenomena may be irregular, i.e., characterized by 
uncertainty (in the Knightian sense), disequilibrium, instability, nonstationarity, bounded 
rationality, and, thus, less-than-rational expectations. He mentions in particular the Great 
Depression that “remains a formidable barrier to a completely unbending application of 
the view that business cycles are all alike” (Lucas 1981: 273). He claims, however, that 
the analysis of irregular phenomena has to remain outside the scope of economic science. 
In Lucas’s opinion, this is not a serious problem, since the Great Depression is the only 
significant example of deep and persistent irregularity in economic phenomena. He 
believes, however, that this historical episode has been an exception and that its weight in 
secular trends has been vanishing with time:  
 
“If the Depression continues, in some respects, to defy 
explanation by existing economic analysis (as I believe it does) 
perhaps it is gradually succumbing to the Law of Large 
Numbers.” (Lucas 1981: 284)  
 
This assertion betrays the conviction that “it”—a severe and persistent financial 
and economic crisis comparable to the Great Depression—cannot happen again and that 
the period of serious financial crises is over. This conviction proved to be just wishful 
thinking since, starting from the early 1980s, we have had financial crises of increasing 
severity and scope up to the grave subprime financial crisis that many observers likened 
to the Great Depression. In recent crises there has been a revival of Minsky’s 
contributions that have been rapidly dismissed and denigrated in periods of apparent 
calm. Many mass-media economists, practitioners (both in management and 
government), and even many academic economists often speak, write, and act as if 
orthodox economics were the true theory in most moments, with the only exceptions of 
Minsky moments considered as extremely rare states of affairs (that, as Greenspan said,   5
“happen once in a century”). They reason as if the laws of economics were temporarily 
and locally suspended in proximity of Minsky meltdowns. 
3 
We may wonder if this schizophrenic attitude is justified. Minsky is typically 
rediscovered when it is too late to avoid or thwart the crisis, since the seeds of the 
following ones, as he often emphasized, are sown in periods of tranquility (Minsky 
1975). We claim that we have to adopt a preanalytic vision that is valid both in calm and 
stormy periods. It is here where Minsky’s FIH is still inspiring. Its contributions apply in 
both situations and account for the transition from normal to troubled times. Of course, it 
is much more difficult to translate such a general vision in explicit analytic models. In our 
opinion, however, a good economic theory is much more than “a set of instructions for 
building” economic models (Lucas 1981). The preanalytic vision (in the sense of 
Schumpeter [1954]) must be general enough to help us choose the right approach for the 
circumstances (Vercelli 2005). 
The practical implications of the regularist approach and the need of a more 
general point of view may be expressed through a parable freely inspired by a famous 
remark by the great philosopher Bertrand Russell (1912):
4 
 
“In the animals farm there was a flock of rational chickens 
(rational in the sense of Lucas) that were more than happy to run 
to the farmer every morning to be fed. Only one eccentric 
chicken was increasingly nervous as he had noticed that older 
chickens had periodically disappeared. One day he expressed the 
fear that the benevolent farmer was fatting them for the 
slaughterhouse. The other chickens did not take him seriously. 
They protested that he was a lugubrious troublemaker and that if 
some chickens had disappeared this depended on a fox 
occasionally perturbing the farm’s tranquility. They claimed, 
however, that no one should worry for the future as the farmer 
had promised to strengthen the fence the day after. That night the 
eccentric chicken escaped from the farm before a stronger fence 
would prevent it and saved himself. The following morning all 





                                                 
3 Similarly, many physicists, even illustrious ones, believed that the laws of physics were distorted or 
“suspended” in proximity to black holes. J. Robert Oppenheimer, for example, maintained that time 
“stopped” in the region characterized by a black hole (Oppenheimer and Volkoff 1939). Physicists 
struggled to build a more general version of relativity theory able to account for the physics of black holes, 
obtaining remarkable success in recent years (starting from Hawking and Penrose [1970]). 
4 This is the remark: “The man who has fed the chicken every day at last wrings its neck instead, showing 
that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken” (Russell 
1912).   6
The moral of this parable is that the rational chickens behaved according to a 
“science” based on empirical regularities (the farmer fed them all the mornings): their 
empirical regularity was apparently wrong only on a particular morning, but that moment 
was the most important one. The eccentric chicken saved himself because he had a more 
general point of view than his fellow “rational” chickens. 
A popular metaphor likens the subprime crisis to a different bird: a black swan. 
When explorers in the newly discovered Australia the found black swans, this surprise 
started to be used as a criticism of induction from empirical regularities to universal laws 
such as “all swans are white.” Since then, the expression black swan has been used to 
indicate an event having a very small probability (in the light of past empirical evidence), 
but cannot be entirely excluded from the set of possible events. Regularism, however, 
may still be defended on practical terms. According to the pragmatic version of the 
regularist view, such as that suggested by Lucas, if we live in Europe, we may be fairly 
confident that swans are white and this empirical regularity may be good enough to guide 
our choices in most circumstances. A landscape painter, for example, could safely decide 
to bring the color white, and not black, to portray a swan swimming in a European lake. 
Such an attitude, however, would be wrongly applied to financial crises for two basic 
reasons. First, although the probability of meeting a black swan in Europe is low, its 
effects (in our case, the consequences of a Minsky moment or, worse, a Minsky 
meltdown) are huge, so we have to take this possibility very seriously.
5 Second, even 
European swans are not always white: young swans are dark gray and become white only 
when they become an adult. Thus, we need a theory of the life cycle of swans in order to 
understand and forecast their color. Financial crises are gray (rather than black) swans 
because they are cyclically recurring. We need a theory that accounts for the whole life 
cycle of financial conditions to explain how they periodically change color and, under 
given circumstances, may become dark black. This is what Minsky did with his FIH. 
 
3. A SUGGESTED CLASSIFICATION OF FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
 
Minsky often started his numerous restatements of the FIH by a classification of the 
financial units according to their financial conditions; see, for example, Minsky (1982 
                                                 
5 Taleb, in his bestselling book The Black Swan, uses the metaphor in a sense similar to that here suggested 
(Taleb 2007). In his opinion, black swans have a crucial importance in Extremistan (although not so much 
in Mediocristan), while the world is becoming increasingly similar to Extremistan. This is particularly true 
with finance.    7
and 1986). We follow the same strategy in this paper, as we need this sort of 
microeconomic foundation to be in a position to pursue the aggregate analysis of 
financial fluctuations. The main reason for this is that, contrary to what is often assumed 
in mainstream economics, financial conditions matter, as they influence the behavior of 
economic units in a crucial way. As is well known, Minsky distinguishes between hedge 
and non-hedge financial units (speculative and Ponzi). Hedge financial units are 
characterized by realized financial outflows not exceeding realized financial inflows and 
therefore do not have liquidity problems in the current period; they expect that this will 
also happen in each of the future periods within the decision time horizon. Speculative 
and Ponzi financial units, on the contrary, have problems of liquidity in the current 
period, as their financial outflows exceed their financial inflows. Speculative financial 
units expect that these liquidity problems will characterize only the early periods of their 
decision time horizon, while they expect a surplus of outflows in subsequent periods 
assuring their solvency. Ponzi units expect instead that their liquidity problems will last 
longer so that only a huge expected surplus in the final period of their time horizon will 
assure, in extremis, their solvency. The Ponzi units are also characterized by a second 
criterion: while the speculative units expect to be always able to pay the interest due, this 
is not true of Ponzi units that have a much more urgent need to roll-over their debt. 
Minsky uses this threefold classification in a very suggestive way and applies it 
with a wealth of illuminating institutional and policy details. However, his taxonomy is 
not fully satisfactory for theoretical and empirical analysis, being a discontinuous 
measure applicable only to solvent units. We adopt a different classification that allows a 
continuous measure in a two-dimensional space and applies also to virtually insolvent 
units. The dimensions we choose are closely related to the two basic dimensions 
considered by Minsky in his classification: an index of liquidity in the period t, kit, that 
measures the ratio between the current realized outflows eit and the current realized 
inflows yit in a certain period; and an index of solvency k*it that measures the 
capitalization of expected k*it for all the future periods within the time horizon m. The 
current financial ratio is thus given by kit = eit / yit . Such a ratio may assume a value 
greater than 1 (which implies a financial deficit) and sustain it for many periods provided 
that it is properly financed; this implies a corresponding reduction in the stock of cash 
balances, an increase in the stock of debt, or a mix of the two, and this affects the 
financial constraints faced by the unit in the future.   8
The crucial variable that defines the financial viability of an economic unit may 
be expressed in a very simple way by an index of solvency, or net worth, of the unit 
obtained by capitalizing the expected kit. We may thus define the following condition of 
financial sustainability: 
 
     k*it  ≤  1 .       ( 1 )  
 
We can understand this condition in intuitive terms by observing that when k*it > 1 the 
“net worth” of the financial unit is negative. In this case the unit is virtually insolvent 
unless it succeeds in promptly realizing a radical financial restructuring or in being bailed 
out by other units or the state.  
These liquidity and solvency indexes are expressed as ratios, rather than 
differences (as in Minsky) because in this way we can represent all the units within a 1x1 
box or in the immediate proximity of its borders. In principle, there are infinite financial 
conditions that can be represented in such a Cartesian space and, in our opinion, this may 
be a significant advantage over Minsky’s ternary classification for the dynamic analysis 
of financial fluctuations. However, we may keep in touch with Minsky’s taxonomy: if we 
consider the space to the left of the solvency barrier, we can easily verify that the units 
underneath the horizontal line are hedge units in the language of Minsky, while the units 
above are speculative or Ponzi units. In his classification, Minsky does not explicitly 
consider the units beyond the vertical line that are virtually insolvent. We believe that this 
is a crucial shortcoming of Minsky’s classification. A virtually insolvent financial unit 
does not necessarily go broke, as it may save itself through a radical 
restructuring/downsizing of its activity, or it may be bailed out by the state or other firms. 
The destiny of such distressed financial units, as we are going to call them, is crucial in 
describing, explaining, and forecasting financial crises, as well as in choosing the best 
possible policy to keep them under control. Therefore, the suggested continuous 
measurement of a unit’s financial conditions allows a ternary classification that is similar, 
but not identical, to Minsky’s classification: hedge, speculative (and Ponzi), and 
distressed units. 
In order to use this Cartesian space for the study of financial fluctuations, we need 
a further essential ingredient. We assume that units, in order to minimize the risk of 
bankruptcy, choose a margin of safety, i.e., a maximum value of the solvency ratio 
sufficiently lower than 1, a threshold beyond which a unit does not want to go. Let’s call   9
the safety margin 1 – μ and let’s assume that 0.5 < 1 - μ < 1. We have to introduce a 
further vertical line at the left of the solvency barrier and this allows a refinement of the 
classification in six financial postures (see figure 1). Units in field 1 may be called 
hyperhedge, as they do not have problems either from the liquidity point of view or from 
the solvency point of view. Units in field 2 are speculative, as they have liquidity 
problems, but do not perceive solvency problems. Units in field 3 are hyperspeculative, 
as they have both liquidity problems and solvency problems. Units in field 4 are hedge 
units because they do not have liquidity problems, but perceive that they may incur 
solvency problems in the future because their safety margin is too small. Finally we have 
to consider the units in financial distress. We can distinguish between highly distressed 
financial units being both illiquid and virtually insolvent (field 5), and distressed units 
that are virtually insolvent, but in the current period have managed to obtain financial 
inflows in excess of financial outflows, therefore raising hopes of survival (field 6). This 
sixfold classification of financial conditions of economic units keeps a connection with 
Minsky’s classification while trying to eliminate some of its shortcomings. 
 
4. THE CORE OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS REVISITED 
 
The modified classification of financial units suggested in the preceding section allows a 
reformulation of the FIH’s core through a very simple model of financial fluctuations in 
the space defined by kit and k*it. We contend that the basic building block of the FIH is 
the interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions (respectively kit and k*it). We 
applied the analysis to all economic units (financial and nonfinancial firms and 
households), as their financial behavior became increasingly integrated in the last 
decades. This approach is sometimes followed also by Minsky (Arestis and Glickman 
2002: 240). Of course, after this first stage of analysis, we should customize it for 
different categories of units. In this paper, however, we keep the analysis at a high level 
of abstraction. 
  The feedback between kit and k*it may be described in the following way (see 
Vercelli [2009] for a more detailed elaboration). As soon as a unit perceives itself to be 
beyond the safety margin 1 - μi , it reacts by reducing its current illiquidity margin (1 - kit) 
in order to decrease k*it. On the other hand, whenever it is within the safe zone (k*it < 1 - 
μi) the unit is pushed by competition to increase the financial outflows more than the 
inflows, and thus kit , in order to increase utility or returns. An increase of kit beyond the   10
liquidity line (kit > 1), in principle, deteriorates k*it by increasing debt while worsening 
expectations and vice versa (see figure 1).  
The feedback between kit and k*it may be represented by a very simple 
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where αi, βi > 0 represent speeds of adjustment of the unit i and a dot over a variable 
indicates the derivative with respect to time.
6 
The phase diagrams of this Lotka-Volterra model show that financial units tend to 
fluctuate in a clockwise direction around the equilibrium point ωi (see figure 1). The 
equilibrium ωi is here a center, while a shock shifts the representative point on a different 
orbit that may be external or internal to the original orbit; for example, see Gandolfo 
(1997).  
In order to understand the financial behavior of economic units we have to 
introduce a further variable: financial fragility. This variable plays a crucial role in 
Minsky’s approach, but its meaning has been quite controversial so far (Goldsmith 1982). 
We define the financial fragility of a unit as the smallest size of the shock that produces 
its virtual bankruptcy. In geometric terms, the degree of financial fragility is given by the 
distance between the representative point and the insolvency line (plus an infinitesimal 
magnitude). A different, but equivalent, phrasing for the same concept could be the 
following: the financial fragility of a unit is given by the smallest size of the shock that 
would make the net worth of the unit negative. Both definitions lead us to interpret 
financial fragility in terms of structural instability (see section 5). 
By aggregating inflows and outflows of the single units we obtain aggregate 
outflows et , aggregate inflows yt , an aggregate liquidity ratio kt, and an aggregate 
solvency ratio, k*t. We interpret this process of aggregation not only as a statistical 
                                                 
6 The specification of this model is based on Vercelli (2000) and Sordi and Vercelli (2006). The model here 
is expressed in continuous time, while shocks are taken into consideration in qualitative terms and play a 
crucial, although accessory, role (see section 5).   11
device, but as the counterpart of a real phenomenon. The dynamic behavior of the units is 
fairly synchronized along the financial cycle for two reasons that determine their herd-
like behavior. First, the pressure of the market pushes comparable commercial units to 
accept a similar risk-taking position to obtain returns not inferior to those of the other 
units. Second, mass psychology spreads waves of optimism and pessimism that affect 
most units; in consequence, the perception of risk becomes insufficient in the boom and 
excessive in depression. By aggregating the financial conditions of all private units we 
obtain a model with the same qualitative characteristics of the micro model. 
The aggregate model so obtained explains why in a monetary economy there is a 
tendency toward persistent financial fluctuations. This is sufficient to account for the 
periodic increase of financial fragility when the representative point moves clockwise in 
fields 2 and 3 (see figure 2). When the economy gets close to the solvency line, a shock 
may push the most fragile units beyond the solvency line, determining their virtual 
bankruptcy. Their outflows are thus drastically cut, reducing the inflows of other units by 
the same amount so that many of them, in turn, are pushed beyond the solvency line. This 
chain reaction triggers the acute phase of a financial crisis. When the contagion affects 
many units and triggers a recession, we have a Minsky meltdown. 
This core of the FIH has to be developed in different directions. In a companion 
paper we develop in more detail the analytical features of the model and its policy 
implications (Vercelli 2009). In this paper we only discuss a few methodological aspects 
of the approach here outlined. 
 
5. METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Although the heuristic model briefly discussed in the preceding section is extremely 
simple, it may be a useful reference for discussing a few methodological issues that have, 
so far, hindered a much-needed development of Minsky’s research program. 
  Let me first observe that Minsky’s vision is much less reductionist than most 
other research programs in economics. The economic system is seen as an open 
evolutionary system characterized by irreversible time. The system is thus characterized 
by complex dynamics so that periods of regular behavior cannot be lightheartedly 
projected into the future. This basic viewpoint has wide-ranging methodological 
implications (Vercelli 2005 and 2009). We tried to capture some of them in the simplest 
possible way through the model sketched above. The model may be sufficient to   12
represent the crucial self-referential loop in a stylized way, typical of a monetary 
economy, between part and whole (as k*t is nothing but the capitalization of expected kt), 
and between present (realized kt) and future (expected k*t ). It is well known that a self-
referential loop of this kind easily leads to complex dynamics and chaos; an example with 
a similar model may be found in Dieci, Sordi, and Vercelli (2006). Thus, the analysis 
cannot be restricted to stationary processes, equilibrium states, or steady paths (as in 
conventional economics) without missing the most important part of the story and giving 
a misleading account of the rest. 
Equilibrium has a role, but only as a benchmark and reference point for analyzing 
the complex dynamics of the system. For example, in figure 1 the point ωi is an 
equilibrium in the dynamic sense of the term, but this does not entail the normative 
overtones of conventional equilibrium modeling. In particular, there is no reason to 
believe that the objective function of a unit is maximized at this point. On the contrary, it 
seems reasonable to assume that a higher point on the vertical passing through ωi may 
imply higher utility or returns with the same margin of safety. However, a unit set on ωi 
cannot reach such a point without triggering a cycle characterized by a persistent 
disequilibrium. In fact, according to the dynamic equations of the model, an exogenous 
shift towards a higher kt would soon push k*t to breach safety margin and this would start 
to exert downward pressure on kt . More in general, the higher points on the vertical 
describing the safety margin are transitory disequilibrium points.  
We cannot assume that equilibrium states or paths are dynamically stable, nor that 
the dynamic system is structurally stable; on the contrary, Minskyan financial instability 
is a combination of dynamic and structural instability. Weak dynamic stability alone 
would be sufficient to explain persistent financial fluctuations that periodically increase 
the financial fragility of units, but, as we have hinted at before, financial fragility should 
be interpreted instead as a measure of structural instability, i.e., the propensity of an 
economic unit to radically change the qualitative characteristics of its financial behavior. 
Although we referred to the mathematical concept of structural instability to clarify the 
logical meaning of financial instability, in order to apply it consistently to our object we 
had to modify it substantially by introducing ε-structural instability; see Vercelli (1991 
and 2001). From the economic point of view, the important point is that financial fragility 
cannot be interpreted correctly in terms of mere dynamic instability. It depends, however, 
on the dynamic instability of the cyclical path and also affects it. We can infer from the 
model above that the less dynamically stable the financial cycle is, the higher the degree   13
of financial fragility eventually reached by the units; conversely, the higher the financial 
fragility of the system, the worse the contagion process that enhances the dynamic 
instability of the system during the acute phase of the crisis. 
In the version of the FIH’s core suggested here, as in that of Minsky, a unit’s 
euphoria does not play a crucial role in explaining financial instability, both in its 
dynamic and structural sense, as the mechanism underlying financial fluctuations would 
produce financial instability and fragility even without euphoria. This is not to deny, 
however, that euphoria is typical of a sufficiently persistent boom and that its spreading 
encourages over-indebtedness and a more speculative stance of units, accelerating the 
inception of a financial crisis and aggravating its manifestations. By inserting in the 
model an endogenous mechanism of production of euphoria during the boom, we would 
make the financial fluctuations of the representative point dynamically unstable (Vercelli 
2009). We prefer, however, to separate these two building blocks of financial instability 
because they are characterized by a different degree of regularity. The dynamic behavior 
of euphoria (though correlated with that of cyclical fluctuations), like all psychological 
phenomena, is much more irregular and is subject to sudden changes that very much 
depend on a host of specific factors that may vary widely from country to country and 
from period to period. 
At this point we have to discuss a possible objection to the specification of the 
model. The model’s conservative nature (in the dynamic sense) has been considered in 
other contexts as quite implausible in economics because it implies structural instability 
in the strict mathematical sense: an infinitesimal perturbation would change the 
qualitative dynamics of the system—a case in point is Goodwin’s (1967) model, which 
has been criticized for this reason, for example, by Desai (1973), while an early defense 
on this point may be found in Vercelli (1983). In the model suggested in this paper, a 
possible justification is that this specification somehow captures structural instability 
observed in the real world. There is something in this answer—in fact, a small 
perturbation may change in the real world the cyclical path from dynamically stable to 
unstable and vice versa. We believe, following Minsky, that the crucial factor of 
instability of a financial system is the periodic increase in financial fragility that 
gradually emerges in periods of tranquility: “[…] success breeds daring, and over time 
the memory of past disaster is eroded. Stability—even of an expansion—is destabilizing 
[…]” (Minsky 1975:127). For this to happen it suffices to assume that dynamic stability 
is too weak to thwart persistent fluctuations. In addition, such a specification may be   14
considered as an appropriate representation of what we believe to be a stylized fact: the 
interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions of financial units brings about 
persistent fluctuations that do not have an intrinsic tendency to change through time. It 
seems reasonable to argue that these changes, that are no doubt observed in the real 
world, depend on different factors that remain exogenous to this specification of the 
FIH’s core.  
The specification chosen for our model may help us to clarify another 
controversial methodological issue: the role of shocks in a model of financial 
fluctuations.
7 In our suggested approach, as we believe in that of Minsky, the financial 
cycle is explained by the structural characteristics of the economy, as represented by the 
equations of the model and is in sharp contrast with the conventional view prevailing in 
macroeconomics since the late 1970s. As is well known, the latter is based upon the 
equilibrium approach worked out by Lucas in the 1970s (Lucas 1981). In this view, 
business cycles should not be interpreted as disequilibrium fluctuations around an 
equilibrium trend, as was usual before, but as the consequence of random shocks 
displacing equilibrium without disrupting it. As for the nature of relevant shocks, the 
prevailing view changed through time. In the first version of equilibrium business cycle 
Lucas considered relevant shocks as essentially monetary impulses brought about by 
discretionary decisions of monetary authorities. In the early 1980s the prevailing view 
shifted towards the “real business cycles” approach (Kydland and Prescott 1982), where 
fluctuations are produced by real shocks (mainly technological impulses). A bit later, 
New Keynesian economics struggled to reintroduce Keynesian features in the model, 
such as asymmetric information; for a survey, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). The 
ensuing “New Consensus” added real and nominal rigidities to the equilibrium approach, 
but did not modify it in a substantial way (Woodford 2003). On the contrary, in a model 
based on the FIH, shocks are not essential in explaining persistent financial fluctuations 
or a financial crisis. In particular, we do not need shocks to explain the periodic increase 
of speculative attitudes, indebtedness, and financial fragility of most units. This is not to 
say, however, that disturbances do not have any role to play in a FIH approach:  
 
“A break in the boom occurs whenever […] reversals in present-
value relations take place. Often this occurs after the increase in 
demand financed by speculative finance has raised interest rates, 
wages of labor, and prices of material.” (Minsky 1986: 220) 
                                                 
7 We define a shock as an impulse from a factor not considered explicitly in the model that impinges on the 
variables of the model.   15
Reversals in present-value relations (that is, when k*it breaches the solvency 
barriers) are more probable the higher the fragility of the units. In a fragile financial 
system, even a “slight disturbance” may precipitate a crisis (Minsky 1964). The concept 
of financial fragility is one of vulnerability to shocks that is periodically increased for 
endogenous reasons, as is also shown in our model. In addition, the triggering shocks are 
also typically endogenous in the sense that they are produced within the economic 
system. There is no point, however, in excluding a role for exogenous shocks produced 
by forces not included in the theory (say, wars, natural catastrophes, or foreign impulses; 
see Arestis and Glickman [2002]). This is particularly important if we use models in the 
analysis. Since models are bound to circumscribe the object of analysis, many factors, 
also economic factors, are condemned to remain exogenous to the model so that their 
impact on the endogenous variables has the logical nature of an exogenous shock, even if 
we rightly believe that these factors are, in fact, endogenous to the economic system. To 
avoid confusion between the two meanings of exogenous, we suggest distinguishing 
between exogenous shock in the usual meaning of factor not explicitly interacting with 
the endogenous variables of the model, and uncorrelated shock for a factor exogenous to 
the model that we believe to be also independent of endogenous variables in the real 
world. Summing up, disturbances have a role to play in the FIH; however, that role is 
very different from the one played in conventional models of the business cycle. In the 
conventional models, shocks are essential and not easily identifiable: 
 
“[…] we are used to thinking of shocks as exogenous events, 
arising from ‘outside the model’ so to speak. However, 
econometricians typically do not measure shocks directly but 
instead infer them from movements in macroeconomic variables 
that they cannot otherwise explain.” (Bernanke 2004) 
 
In this view, shocks are, by definition, the cause of fluctuations that economic 
fundamentals cannot explain, while in the FIH we would have fluctuations anyhow; in 
addition, the relevant disturbances affecting them are sizeable, identifiable, and have, in 
principle, an explanation. 
Since the economic system is considered by the FIH as an open process 
characterized by irreversible time and complex dynamics, it is intrinsically unpredictable. 
This does not imply that we are left completely without compass in our decisions. We 
cannot rely on traditional probability and decision theories unless we are in a period of 
tranquility. Even in this case, however, conventional probability and decision theories can   16
be used, but only with the greatest caution. We have to resort to unconventional 
probability theory (such as Choquet theory of capacities) or unconventional decision 
theories in conditions of hard uncertainty. In particular we should expect the periodic 
emergence of financial fragility and the risk of recurrent financial crises unless we take 
structural measures to mitigate them. In such a world, the economic agents cannot be 
rational in the usual sense. We cannot assume that agents succeed in converging 
instantaneously to the equilibrium position, maximizing their objective function. This, 
however, does not imply sheer irrationality. A rational agent may rely on the rules of 
behavioral rationality adapting in the best possible way to a changing environment, 
taking account of the influence that may be exerted on the environment (Vercelli 2005). 
Finally, we emphasize that in the open world of FIH the relationship between 
microeconomics and macroeconomics is much more complex than in conventional 
economics. The analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations is based on a previous analysis 
of a unit’s financial conditions, but is not derived from a simple linear aggregation of 
average behaviors. Aggregation is rooted in real-word processes that we mentioned above 
(section 4). The behavior of a financial unit, studied in isolation from the movement of 
other units, is unlikely to exhibit a very regular pattern because each unit is heavily 
conditioned by specific features: different risk aversion, technological impulses, regional 
constraints, and so on. A certain degree of regularity and synchronization is conferred to 
single units by the common influence exerted on them by aggregate financial 
fluctuations.  
Summing up, a full-fledged behavioral analysis of a unit’s dynamic behavior 
requires macroeconomic foundations, while the study of aggregate fluctuations has to 
rely on microeconomic foundations (analysis of a single unit’s financial conditions). The 
interaction between micro- and macro-foundations does not involve a vicious logical 
circle, as it is the consequence of a real process: the financial behavior of each unit is 
heavily influenced by the behavior of all the other units, as expressed by aggregate 
indexes. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we argued that Minsky’s FIH initiated a research program that is still worth 
pursuing in order to understand the working and evolution of financial capitalism and, in 
particular, the recurring episodes of financial instability. What is really topical of   17
Minsky’s contributions is the underlying vision concerning the working of a sophisticated 
monetary economy, rather than the analytical constructs in which he tried to translate it. 
In particular, we maintained that the complex and well-articulated vision underlying the 
FIH did not lose its grip with the real world. On the contrary, its relevance for 
understanding, preventing, or at least mitigating financial crises has actually increased, 
provided that we update and develop its insights from the analytical point of view. 
However, we cannot succeed in this task unless we understand the far-reaching 
methodological features of the approach designed and practiced by Minsky himself. This 
paper pursued this direction of analysis by suggesting a more general taxonomy of a 
unit’s financial conditions. We argued that this alternative classification has the 
advantage of being continuous and has the ability to explicitly include the units that are 
nearly bankrupt. This allowed a study of a unit’s fluctuations in the Cartesian space of 
financial conditions that has been used to clarify the core of the FIH and Minsky’s 
powerful methodological approach. We hope that the approach here advocated may be a 
starting point to update and develop the FIH in order to increase its theoretical and 
empirical scope.   18
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Figure 2: Aggregate Financial Fluctuations 
 
 